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ADVANCING SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE: THE LEGAL STEPS
NECESSARY TO FURTHER ECONOMIC RELATIONS *
I. INTRODUCTION: THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE
FUTURE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
In the last few years, the world has witnessed the virtual end of the
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.1 Amidst the
advances of democracy throughout Eastern Europe,2 Mikhail Gorbachev3
has directed the Communist leadership to abandon the absolute control it
once maintained over the political and economic systems of both the
Soviet Union and the overwhelming majority of the Communist block
countries.4 As the world's most influential national economy, the United
States has earned the potential role of resurrecting the Soviet economy by
steering it toward a free market, unencumbered by counterproductive
government restraints.5
* Author's Note: As of July 8, 1991, a key development in Soviet-American trade has
occurred. The Supreme Soviet has passed the initial emigration legislation necessary to
satisfy American law under the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Although symbolic at this early
stage, enactment of Soviet emigration legislation officially satisfies the Jackson-Vanik
requirements and therefore, the United States can begin increasing Soviet-American trade
by promulgating the 1990 Trade Agreement. To date, the United States government has
yet to take any positive, mutually beneficial, legal steps of its own in order to further
economic relations.
1. Brady, Galuszka, Reichlin & Kharkov, Shattered Dreams: Gorbachev Tries to Cure
Soviet Economic Ills by Turning to Repression, BUS. WK., Feb. 11, 1991, at 38 [hereinafter
Shattered Dreams].
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADITIONS 731 (1985). In his analysis of the Soviet political system, Christopher Osakwe
describes the hierarchy of power within each branch of the Soviet government. Id.
Presently, Mikhail Gorbachev is chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) as well as general secretary of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the CPSU, the two highest positions in the Soviet government. Id.
(Officially, the Communist party functions as the political conscience of the Soviet
government.) Id.
4. Shattered Dreams, supra note 1, at 38.
5. Commerce's Mosbacher Says Soviet Union Likely to Clear Way for Men Within
Weeks, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1429 (Sept. 19, 1990) [hereinafter
Mosbacher Says]. Primarily, this will be achieved by the United States granting most-
favored-nation (MFN) trade status to the Soviet Union which will enable both countries to
receive mutually advantageous trade benefits and give the Soviets access to financial and
investment support from American-based international banks. Id. Additionally, the United
States has been encouraging the Soviet Union to privatize industry and abandon burdensome
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While the Soviet economy is restructuring itself away from govern-
ment control and command economic planning toward a free market,6 the
United States has the opportunity to exercise significant influence in
Soviet-American political and economic relations. As the United States
directly encourages bilateral trade with the Soviets, it will lay the
foundation for Soviet competition in the global marketplace. Global
economic participation would subsequently lead to both a vastly improved
domestic economy and an increased standard of living for Soviet citizens.7
The future of Soviet-American political and economic relations is firmly
based upon significantly expanded bilateral trade between these two former
adversaries.8
Bilateral trade is fundamentally based upon the mutual grants of
nondiscriminatory, most-favored-nation (MFN) status.9  MFN status
allows nations to import and export commodities at the lowest possible
governmental regulation over all private enterprise. Id.
6. Major Agreements on Trade Facilitation, Grain Sales Signed at U.S. -Soviet Summit,
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 786 (June 6, 1990) [hereinafter Major Agreements].
The Soviet Union is attempting to restructure its deteriorating economy by facilitating trade
with the United States. Id. Such projects currently being implemented between the two
countries include a long term grain agreement, a Caspian Sea oil exploration venture and
agreements on civil aviation, maritime transportation and customs cooperation. Id. at 788.
See generally Note, Joint Venture Law in the Soviet Union, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 499 (1990). These endeavors represent only a fraction of the collective
commercial capacity that these two enormous countries could potentially share. Major
Agreements, supra, at 788-89. The Trade Agreement of 1990, see infra notes 30-53 and
accompanying text & app., sets forth the essential legal framework for facilitating the
common goals of mutual economic cooperation between the two countries and provides for
American assistance to the Soviet Union as it makes the transition from a command
economy to a free market system. Id. at 788.
7. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 786; see also Gerasimov on Agenda for Summit
Soviet Jewish Emigration, Brit. Broadcasting Corp; Summary World Rep., June 1, 1990,
at AI (original broadcast from Tass on May 30, 1990) [hereinafter Gerasimov on Agenda].
Specifically, participating directly in the new market economy would provide the Soviet
citizens a wider range of food, consumer goods and services; market competition would
thus allow new organizations to thrive while keeping actual prices competitive. Id. at Al -
3.
8. Major Agreements, supra note 6; Gerasimov on Agenda, supra note 7 (discussing the
summit and the activities concerning trade development and noting that the governments
repeatedly profess their common goal of encouraging and promoting trade and commercial
development between the two countries).
9. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1974). The Act was promulgated
by the United States to advance global trading relations and to encourage American-based
international commercial associations which could compete successfully in the growing
international marketplace. Id.
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tariff rates.'" American-based MFN status, however, does require
certain governmental actions from the other participating country." In
particular, the United States will grant MFN status to the Soviet Union
with the following condition: the Soviet Union must promulgate legislation
guaranteeing the right of free emigration for its citizens. 2
While this condition may appear to be an inappropriate usurpation of
Soviet sovereignty, the United States is simply showing the Soviet Union
that national economic reform and freedom must be based on the free
exercise of those rights that virtually all Western people share) 3
II. THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 AND THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT
PROHIBITING MFN STATUS TO ANY COUNTRY WITHOUT FREE EMIGRATION
Currently, the Trade Act of 1974' 4 provides the applicable legal
framework for bilateral international trade with the United States. This
comprehensive agreement was enacted:
To authorize the President ... to enter into trade agreements
with foreign countries for the purpose of establishing fairness and
equity in international trading relations, including
(b) the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to ...
international trade, and
(c) the securing for the commerce of the United States, on a
basis of reciprocity, equal competitive opportunities in foreign
markets and to promote the economic growth of, and full
employment in, the United States.' 5
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Mosbacher Says, supra note 5. The American government is standing firm on
its commitment to deny MFN status to the Soviet Union unless the Soviet government
promulgates unrestricted emigration legislation. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 786-
87; see also Legislative History of the Trade Act of 1974, P.L. 93-618, at 7333
[hereinafter Legislative History] ("The Committee strongly believes that the authority to
extend or withdraw nondiscriminatory treatment to countries not now receiving such
treatment could be a useful factor in enabling the President to obtain important mutual and
material economic benefits for the United States, while at the same time, improving
relations with these countries. ").
13. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 788.
14. 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1974).
15. Legislative History, supra note 12, Purposes of the Bill, cls. (l)(b)-(c).
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The long term goal of the Trade Act of 1974 was to provide increased
bilateral trade opportunities by reducing the legal restrictions governing
Soviet-American trade at that time. The legislative history of the Trade
Act of 1974 further explicates the general purposes set forth in section I
by presenting more detailed goals that both Congress and the Senate
sought to achieve with this legislation:
To require the President in the exercise of his trade agreement
authority to assure reciprocal trade benefits, and in particular fair
treatment and equitable market access for exports of the United
States, through the full exercise of rights in such agreements,
including the reform and revision of the rules of international
trade... and To expand investment and employment opportuni-
ties . . . and To authorize the President to extend most-favored-
nation (nondiscriminatory) treatment, upon certain conditions, to
countries not presently receiving such treatment and to provide
adequate safeguards against market disruption by imports into the
United States from such countries.6
Therefore, nondiscriminatory status (MFN) is the foundation of any
mutually advantageous bilateral trade agreement between the United States
and any other sovereign nation.17 Without being granted MFN status,
American imports from a participating country will be dutied at substan-
tially higher rates than imports from MFN countries. 8 Thus, without
this key trade benefit, tariffs will average between thirty and several
hundred percent of a product's import price.19 Indisputably, it is finan-
cially advantageous for countries to maintain MFN trading status with
each other.
According to the Trade Act of 1974, a participating Eastern (specifi-
cally Communist or Socialist) country must have a liberal emigration
16. Id. cls. 4, 11, 14.
17. Id. Purposes of the Bill.
18. Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Granting Most-Favored-Nation Treatment andAccess
to U.S. Financial Programs to the Soviet Union, Cong. Research Serv., at I (Dec. 20,
1989) [hereinafter CRS Report] ("MFN treatment in trade basically means applying to the
trade with [a country] all (primarily tariff) concessions and privileges that have been
extended to any other country. . . . MFN treatment is one of the basic principles of
international trade . . . as a rule constituting a reciprocal obligation of the contracting
parties . . . under bilateral trade agreements in the United States.).
19. Riley, Low Tariffs Won't Give Instant Gain to Soviets, Wash. Times, Feb. 9, 1990,
at CIO, col. 1 (discussing the mutual economic advantages that would be available with the
enactment of MFN status and comparing the current trade figures with the potential long
term growth that would occur if MFN were to be granted to the Soviet Union).
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policy before MFN status will be granted.' When the act was promul-
gated, the United States codified this requirement as the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment.2" "The Jackson-Vanik [A]mendment to the Trade Act of
1974 sets compliance with its freedom-of-emigration requirements as the
main condition for granting the most-favored-nation status to the Soviet
Union."' The Jackson-Vanik Amendment' provides:
(Title IV) would impose several conditions on the delegation of
authority of the President to extend nondiscriminatory treatment.
Section 402 would provide that no country would be eligible to
receive nondiscriminatory tariff treatment or U.S. Government
credits or investment guarantees if the President determines such
country:
(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
20. § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1974). This section of the Trade Act sets forth the
specific conditions for receiving MFN treatment. It discusses the absolute necessity of a
liberalized emigration policy as a prior condition to receiving MFN trade status. Id.
A number of legal scholars have discussed the history of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment. Most notably, Thomas Hoya states: "[t]hat Act, chiefly in response to Soviet
denial of emigration to many Soviet Jews, ties much of the U.S. regulation of East-West
trade to freedom of emigration from communist countries." T. HOYA, EAST WEST TRADE,
36 (1984). Furthermore, "[t]he Committee hopes that this section will provide an incentive
to the Soviet Union and other countries to discontinue restrictive emigration practices in the
interest of developing economic relations with the United States." Legislative History,
supra note 12, at 7338.
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. "While the Jackson-Vanik amendment
itself constitutes section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2432) . . . the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment denies eligibility for MFN treatment and for U.S. Government credits
and credit and investment guarantees . . . to any nonmarket economy country . . . denying
its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate." CRS Report, supra note 18, at 3.
22. "Compliance with the freedom-of-emigration requirements ... suffices for allowing
the Soviet Union access to U.S. financial programs (essentially, export credits and credit
guarantees) under the Jackson-Vanik law." CRS Report, supra note 18, summary.
23. Specifically, in an exchange of letters between Henry Kissinger and Senator Henry
Jackson, the amendment is given the popular name of the Jackson Amendment. Legislative
History, supra note 12, at 7333. Representative Charles Vanik, co-sponsor of the
amendment, is not discussed in the legislative history. Id. at 7333-38. However,
[i]n response to this restrictive measure (restricted emigration), legislation was
introduced . . . in both Houses under the principal sponsorship of Sen. Henry
M. Jackson and Rep. Charles J. Vanik . . . to prohibit the conclusion of a trade
agreement and the extension of MFN status (as well as U.S. Government credits
and credit and investment guarantees) to any "nonmarket economy" that restricts
the right of its citizens to emigrate.
CRS Report, supra note 18, at 2.
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(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on
the visas or other documents required for emigration, for
any purpose or cause whatsoever; or
(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or
other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire
of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.'
Accordingly, no country with a restrictive and oppressive emigration
policy would be able to take advantage of the reduced tariffs, credits,
investment opportunities and trade guarantees that the Trade Act of 1974
offered.'
Adhering to the restrictions set forth in the Jackson-Vanik Amend-
ment, the United States currently maintains an extraordinarily limited
trading relationship with the Soviet Union.' This policy has prevented
bilateral trade from forging the economic ties necessary to increase trade
and business between the two countries." Furthermore, Soviet-American
commercial enterprises have been unable to obtain access to American
financial programs, such as those provided by the Export-Import Bank of
the United States and the Commodity Credit Corporation.2"
As the Soviet political climate has changed, allowing Gorbachev to
initiate the social, economic and legal changes taking place, the United
24. Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 § 402,
88Stat. 1978, 2056 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432) [hereinafter Jakson-Vanik
Amendment] (emphasis added). In the legislative history, Congress specifically enumerates
the conditions for MFN under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment: "A country would become
eligible for nondiscriminatory treatment under this title only after the President determined
that it was not violating any of the above conditions and so reported his determination to
Congress." Legislative History, supra note 12, at 7213.
25. "Any country which was found to be denying its citizens the right to emigrate would
also be prohibited from receiving any U.S. Government credits, credit guarantees, and from
entering into bilateral trade agreements." Legislative History, supra note 12, at 7213.
26. As of November 1990, the Trade Act of 1974 is the enforced legal framework of
international trade. CRS Report, supra note 18, at 1. Since the Soviet Union has not yet
codified a liberal emigration policy, the United States is still bound by the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment prohibiting the United States from granting the Soviet Union MFN status
without such emigration legislation. Id. Without MFN status as the foundation for
bilateral trade, the two countries are not able to form mutually profitable economic
associations. Id.; see also Letter from Joseph M. Grieco, Director for Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union of the Office of the United States Trade Representative to Author (Oct.
24, 1990) [hereinafter Grieco Letter]. This letter contains the United States government's
current political position on this emigration/trade issue as set forth by President Bush
through the USTR Ambassador Carla Hills and communicated by Joseph Grieco.
27. CRS Report, supra note 18, at 1-4.
28. Id. at 19-22.
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States has begun to look toward the political and economic future it will
have with its former nemesis. Planning this imminent transformation
together, the leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union held
a summit in 1990 in order to lay the legal framework for their newly
proposed economic alliance.'
III. THE TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1990: THE FOUNDATION OF IMPROVED
TRADING RELATIONS AND MUTUAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS
On June 1, 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a compre-
hensive trade agreement in an effort to deepen the economic relationship
between the two countries.' The Trade Agreement of 1990 covers a
broad area of potentially profitable trade opportunities, including, but not
limited to, MFN status, reciprocal trade promotion and business and
commercial investment facilitation. 31 The agreement also provides legal
safeguards against market disruption, policies for dispute settlement and
protection of intellectual property rights.32
While no legislative history is available on the Trade Agreement of
1990, 3 the purposes for entering into this bilateral accord are set forth
in the introduction to the agreement. Both governments signed the Trade
Agreement of 1990:
Recognizing that the development of bilateral trade may contrib-
ute to better mutual understanding and cooperation . . . Taking
into account the favorable implications for trade expansion and
economic restructuring and the development of a market-based
economy in the USSR . . . . Considering that expanded trade
relations between the Parties will contribute to the general well-
being of the peoples of each Party, and promote respect for
29. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 788. The article also discusses the transition
of the Soviet market and the specific mechanics of the 1990 summit in Washington, D.C.,
including the actual signing of the Trade Agreement of 1990. Id. at 788-89.
30. Agreement on Trade Relations, June 1, 1900, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-
United States, 29 I.L.M. 946 (1990) [hereinafter Trade Agreement of 1990]. According
to White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, "improved economic ties between the United
States and the Soviet Union were in the best interest of both countries." Major
Agreements, supra note 6, at 789.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Since the Trade Agreement of 1990 has not yet been ratified by Congress, there is
no official legislative history on this particular agreement. Therefore, the text of the
agreement and the available governmental commentary provide the only evidence of
congressional and executive intent.
1990]
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internationally recognized rights of working people ....
Considering that economic ties are an important and necessary
element in the strengthening of their bilateral economic relations
34
Reiterating the goals of the Trade Act of 1974, the Trade Agreement
of 1990 is broader in scope, specifically addressing each of the legal
restrictions currently limiting Soviet-American trade. 35 The director for
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of the Office of the United States
Trade Representative, Joseph Grieco, has clarified the United States'
government's position by stating that "Et]his Administration is working
actively to lay the foundations for the expansion of trade relations with the
Soviet Union in keeping with that country's efforts to undertake political
and economic reforms."' The Bush administration has committed itself
to Soviet-American trade expansion which will benefit the Soviet Union
and the United States, both politically and economically.37
The signing of the Trade Agreement of 1990 between the United
States and the Soviet Union is testament to the shared conviction "that an
agreement of trade relations between the two Parties will best serve their
mutual interests." 3" It is clear from both the enumerated and general
purposes of the agreement that both governments and their respective
citizens can potentially profit from a stronger economic association.39
From the Soviet position, bilateral trade with the United States has the
potential to transform and advance the severely depressed economy
immeasurably.' From the American viewpoint, the agreement would
directly promote American business in the Soviet marketplace.4"
Overall, an improved Soviet-American commercial relationship would
facilitate unprecedented economic cooperation between these two powerful
sovereign nations.
Yet, the Soviet Union is in a precarious position by virtue of its
failing domestic economy.42 Characteristically, the Soviet government
34. Trade Agreement of 1990, supra note 30, at 949.
35. Id.
36. Grieco Letter, supra note 26.
37. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 786-89.
38. Both countries are establishing "a framework which will foster the development and
expansion of commercial ties between Soviet organizations and United States nationals and
companies." Trade Agreement of 1990, supra note 30, at 949.
39. Id.
40. See generally supra notes 5-7, 19 and accompanying text.
41. See generally supra notes 5-7, 19, & 31 and accompanying text.
42. Shattered Dreams, supra note 1; at 38-42.
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takes the public position of merely requesting improved economic and
trade relations with the United States. 43 After returning from an official
visit to the Soviet Union, however, United States secretary of commerce
Robert Mosbacher pointed out quite succinctly that "[t] hey need our help
... [t]hey realize they need to change to a market economy, and they
want our help. They know that technologically and from a capital
standpoint, we're the most logical people to get in and help them.""
American assistance and collaboration in business sectors such as
energy, transportation, manufacturing and general economic productivity
is potentially available to the Soviet Union and its citizens. 45 The Trade
Agreement of 1990 provides the legal framework for advancing both
countries' economies and directly encourages Soviet and American citizens
to engage in mutually profitable business associations. ' Each specific
provision of the accord addresses an individual commercial agreement,
rigorously negotiated since the Malta Summit in December 1989 where
both Presidents Bush and Gorbachev demonstrated their willingness to
improve trade relations by initiating this comprehensive agreement.47
Article I is the agreement's key provision, granting MFN status to both
countries provided the Soviet Union complies with the requirements of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment by liberalizing its emigration laws.4
As previously discussed, MFN status carries with it a prerequisite of
unrestricted emigration. The United States is prepared to assist the
Soviets by enacting this current trade agreement if and only if the Soviet
Union liberalizes and codifies its emigration policies.49 President Bush
has personally emphasized that he will not send the agreement to Congress
for ratification until the Supreme Soviet' has approved liberal emigration
legislation.5 United States secretary of state James Baker has gone as far
as to say that "[w]hat the Soviets really want, and the real prize, is the
43. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 789.
44. Mosbacher Says, supra note 5, at 1430-31.
45. See generally Trade Agreement of 1990, supra note 30 app.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 786.
50. In his examination of the Supreme Soviet, Christopher Osakwe provides an analysis
of the composition of this Soviet legislative body. As the Supreme Soviet is the official law
making component of the Soviet legal system, the Supreme Soviet therefore would serve
as the governmental body that would enact the liberalized emigration legislation necessary
to satisfy American law. M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, supra note 3, at 716-
18.
51. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 788.
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granting of most-favored-nation status."5" Secretary Baker also declared
that: "[t]his trade agreement has no effect whatsoever until it is approved
by the Congress . . . [the Soviets] understand full well that they will not
get MFN . . . until that legislation passes the Supreme Soviet. ""
In order to further the political and economic interests of the Soviet
Union and the United States, both the Bush and Gorbachev administrations
have demonstrated their mutual desire to promote economic cooperation
by reducing the legal barriers to bilateral trade. Once the Soviets
promulgate liberalized emigration legislation, Congress will enact the
Trade Agreement of 1990 which will eliminate the counterproductive legal
obstacles and provide direct incentives including MFN status, intellectual
property protection and direct financial assistance to participating
enterprises. These benefits will begin to facilitate long-term economic
cooperation between the two countries.
IV. THE CONFLICT WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT BASED ON
SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE
Now that the United States and the Soviet Union have laid the legal
foundation for enhanced trade relations, the Soviet Union has the ultimate
decision to make. The Soviet government, alone, must decide whether to
codify its emigration policies. Once codified, promulgated and duly
enforced, the United States can enact the Trade Agreement of 1990 and
seriously begin to assist the Soviet Union in reforming its languishing
economy.' Then, and only then, both countries can begin to realize the
benefits of mutual economic cooperation potentially available through the
provisions of the agreement.5"
Not surprisingly, the Soviet government has been unwilling to give
official attention to the Trade Agreement of 1990 and the emigration
issue. It does acknowledge "[its significance] as a long-term foundation
for our normal relations overall, and the economic area especially. " "
According to the head of the Information Directorate of the USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gennady Gerasimov, United States-Soviet
52. Id. at 790.
53. Id. at 792.
54. Id. at 786-92.
55. Once promulgated, both countries can begin to formulate new commercial
associations as provided by this agreement. Id.
56. Id. at 787; Gerasimov on Agenda, supra note 7, at Al.
57. This quotation is attributed to Vitaly Churkin, a key adviser to former Soviet foreign
minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 788.
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trade, however, is not a matter of specifically significant importance. 58
Gerasimov continued by saying, "[w]hen they were unified, Germany
would undoubtedly be the USSR's most important trade partner. Of
course, the Soviet Union would like to improve trade relations with the
USA. American business was also interested in this . . . but the USA
continued to link trade with other problems. "59 Without being specific,
Gerasimov undoubtedly was making reference to the emigration issue.
Although Gerasimov refuses to address the emigration issue directly,
the Soviet deputy minister of foreign economic relations, Yuriy Chuma-
kov, has stated that based on the significant problems with the Soviet
economy, "the emigration vote was postponed."' Deputy Minister
Chumakov then discussed the proposed law before the Supreme Soviet.6'
He maintained that the primary concern for the delay of the emigration
legislation vote was the potential hard currency shortage that would occur
if a mass emigration took place; this problem would arise since emigres
are to be reimbursed in hard currency for their property when leaving the
Soviet Union.62  The Soviet government supports the position that
emigration is not as serious a problem as the world perceives it to be, as
everyone in the government officially supports the new law.' The facts,
however, stand in sharp contrast: as of the signing of the trade agreement
on June 1, 1990,1 the liberalized Soviet emigration legislation, which is
necessary to satisfy American law,' has yet to be enacted.
This bureaucratic postponement is indicative of the overall internal
conflict among the top Soviet economic policy makers.' Currently,
there is a fierce battle waging between the economic reformers and the
58. Id. at 790.
59. Id.
60. Soviet Emigration Vote Postponed by More Pressing Economic Concerns, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 846 (June 13, 1990) [hereinafter Emigration Vote
Postponed]. Soviet officials continuously have prioritized the current economic problems
(and the need for immediate government intervention) over the emigration legislation
declaring that voting on the emigration legislation simply is not as important as addressing
the formidable domestic economic (legislative) issues. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also The Economist Survey on the Soviet Union, Economist, Oct. 20, 1990,
supplemental pull-out. Among other topics, the survey discusses the current emigration
policies in force and the future of Soviet emigration. Id.
63. Emigration Vote Postponed, supra note 60, at 848. Query: if everyone truly
supports the emigration legislation before the Supreme Soviet, then why the delay?
64. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 786.
65. Emigration Vote Postponed, supra note 60, at 849; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2432
(1974).
66. Shattered Dreams, supra note 1, at 39-42.
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Communist hard-liners in the Soviet government,67 with President
Gorbachev trying desperately to reach a compromise between these two
ideological extremes." The reformers are clearly in favor of Western
assistance and the transformation of the failing Communist system to a full
market economy.' Gorbachev, however, systematically has filled his
cabinet with more conservative, Communist economists.' These hard-
liners are in favor of shifting the economic focus away from the West and
refocusing economic change based on traditional Communist planning
methods.71
Alarmingly, the Soviet government has been influenced by these hard-
liners who demand that change in the current Soviet economic policy be
based on central planning and not on free market ideals.' Due to this
seemingly overwhelming pressure, Gorbachev has been loath to make the
switch to a full-fledged capitalism-based market economy.' His overall
vision is similar to the hard-line view: both theories recognize the need to
overhaul the Soviet economic system while preserving Socialist ideolo-
gy.74 This Socialist based economy, however, has failed to maintain the
Soviet Union as an economic power.75 As influential as these conserva-
tive officials may be, Gorbachev, nevertheless, has committed the Soviet
Union to restructuring its economy by seeking Western assistance.76 The
legal framework for American participation in this desperately needed
economic overhaul has been outlined by the Trade Agreement of 1990,7
subject to liberalized emigration legislation.
67. Id. at 42. The reformers include Eduard Shevardnadze, former foreign minister,
Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Republic of the Soviet Union, Stanislav Shatalin,
economist and author of the 500-Day Plan (which would have formally set the timetable
for the transition to a full market economy) and Nikolai Petrakov, Gorbachev's former
personal economic advisor. Id.
The hard-liners include Valentin Pavlov, prime minister of the Soviet Union, Yuri
Maslyukov, deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union and Vladimir Kryuchkov, chief of
the Committee for State Security, the KGB. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Emigration Vote Postponed, supra note 60, at 849.
70. Shattered Dreams, supra note 1, at 42.
71. Id. at 40.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Mosbacher Says, supra note 5, at 1430.
76. See Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 786.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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By not passing this legislation, the Soviet government is dismissing the
myriad of economic advantages that would occur with MFN treatment.
Long-term benefits include "retooling the transport and communications
systems and supplying technology to develop the key economic sectors,
including the oil industry" and "the transition to a market economy. " '
Additionally, individual business would benefit by becoming eligible
to receive investment assistance and financial backing from the United
States Export Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion.' These programs include export, agricultural and energy credits
as well as investment capital.8" This would encourage joint ventures and
marketing/licensing agreements as well as provide access to the vast
markets of both the Soviet Union and the United States.' Therefore,
individual business people could begin to expand and invest in each other's
marketplace. The increased business opportunities would directly benefit
both economies, as business and employment would expand to keep pace
with the newly formed associations.
As important as these benefits may appear from a traditionally
capitalist perspective, the Soviets may need such comprehensive trade and
economic advantages. According to Joseph Pelzman, an American
economics professor who specializes in Soviet-American trade, "MFN
treatment is a necessary condition for the Soviet Union if it wants to
export its way out of its economic crisis ...with export goods such as
fish products, textiles, and apparel benefiting the most."' The Soviets
also could expand their exports as its production facilities shift from
traditional manufacturing into "value-added areas, such as ready-made
goods, and machines, and equipment."' Furthermore, improved
technological advances within its oil industry would help the Soviet Union,
as the world's largest oil producing nation, earn desperately needed hard
currency."
Simply stated, the Soviet Union has the ability to realize these
unlimited economic benefits by participating in bilateral trade with the
79. Id.
80. Mosbacher Says, supra note 5, at 1429.
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 6-7, 19 & 32 and accompanying text.
83. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 786-87.
84. Emigration Vote Postponed, supra note 60, at 846.
85. Commerce's Willide Discusses Administration Efforts to Assist Reform is Eastern
Europe, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1308 (Aug. 22, 1990) [hereinafter Willkie
Discusses]. Commerce Department general counsel Wendell Willkie II, while addressing
Soviet-American trade at the American Bar Association's annual meeting, stated that "[tihe
largest constraint on increased trade with the U.S.S.R. is the lack of hard currency in the
Soviet Union." Id.
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United States. It is in a position to increase its share in the global
economy by working directly with the world's largest economy.' The
sole condition that must be met by Soviet Union is a liberalized, codified
emigration policy which would connect the two countries in an economi-
cally beneficial association. 7
V. SOVIET EMIGRATION LEGISLATION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS
The urging for basic human rights is not a substantial infringement of
Soviet supremacy over its internal affairs, nor is it an unreasonable request
to make of a society in desperate need of economic reorganization."'
The Soviet people's long-term desires are described by the Russian poet
Andrei Voznesensky: "I want our economy to be the same as in the West.
I want out people to have a good quality of life, a good level, the same as
in America, and technology the same as in . . . America."9 The Soviet
government stands alone as the institution that can begin to help its own
people. "Economists and political thinkers blame the Stalinist command
economy and rigid central control.., apathy, indifference.., and a lack
of respect have become rampant ... as has aggressive envy of those who
earn a lot, even if they earn it honestly."' As Voznesensky suggests,
86. Fed. Info. Systems Corp., Fed. News Serv., July 19, 1990 (Commerce & Trade).
The United States is the largest, most productive economy in the world. Id. With
approximately five percent of the world's population, the United States produces over 26%
of the world's gross national product (GNP). Id. Moreover, considering economic factors
such as GNP, gross domestic product (GDP), producer price index (PPI) and international
trade volume, the American economy is more than 2.5 times the size of Japan, the world's
second largest economy. Id.
87. Trade Agreement of 1990, supra note 30, at 949; see also Wilikie Discusses, supra
note 85, at 1308. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh pointed out that "[any] trade
agreement remains contingent upon legislative action by the Supreme Soviet in support of
free emigration. We are . . . watching to see that opportunities to emigrate are
institutionalized in law and practice and are not episodic in the present uncertain flux of
Soviet democratization." Id.
88. "The Committee believes that it is equally reasonable to establish conditions on all
basic human rights, including the right to emigrate ... before extending broad concessions
to communist countries." Legislative History, supra note 12, at 7338. While this belief
specifically may apply to the Trade Act of 1974, the currently prevailing sentiment in the
United States government remains consistent with the predominate opinion popular during
the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974. Grieco Letter, supra note 26.
89. Smith, The Russian Character, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 32
(providing an overview of the declining domestic (Soviet) economy and supplies ample
commentary by both prominent and ordinary Soviet citizens).
90. Id. at 60.
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rigid Communist control over the Soviet economy has caused the Soviet
people to suffer and become indifferent to their work.9"
While this cultural phenomenon cannot change overnight, certain
obvious conclusions can be reached. The need for change would
necessarily diminish the role of the government in business develop-
ment.' With a new outlook on social (emigration) legislation, as well
as an open mind to Western commercial innovation, the Soviet govern-
ment can begin to restore the Soviet citizens' pride as well as their work
ethic. The American work ethic of reaping one's own rewards can pass
to both Soviet business executives and laborers through commercial
associations with their American counterparts.
Under the current system, consumer goods and food are in increasing-
ly short supply while black-market speculators illegally profit from the
inefficiency of the Soviet economic, machine.' Soviet citizens have
expressed a strong desire for active government intervention to correct this
obvious inequality.' One Soviet woman has stated, "I hope they'll put
things in some kind of order . . . this screwup can't go on forever."9 5
Gorbachev has recognized that the entire system of motivation and
incentive has to be changed in order to encourage competition and
individual initiative.' This change also must eliminate the pervasive
indifference that both hinders economic development and encourages
illegal trade.97 By forming unprecedented commercial associations with
the United States, Gorbachev can begin to dismantle the system that has
created indifference and economic stagnation.
Economic participation with the United States will directly benefit the
Soviet economy by fostering economic development and commercial
innovation.s This economic cooperation is one of the most significant
advances the Soviet government has made in its efforts to become a free
market economic system. While the top Soviet leaders9 consistently
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Shattered Dreams, supra note I, at 42.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Keller, Four Gorbachev Years: Hope to Disillusion In Soviet Life, Thaw Becomes
Chill, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1991, at A12, col.. 1.
97. Id.
98. See Mosbacher Says, supra note 5, at 1429.
99. Keller, Gorbachev Offers His Plan to Remake Soviet Economy, N.Y. Times, Oct.
7, 1990, at A8, col. 1 (reporting on the continuous political debates between President
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin and highlighting the different directions the two leaders
believe the Soviet Union and the Republic economies should follow).
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argue over how to rearrange the economy permanently, their common goal
is to transform the economy and save the Soviet Union from total
economic destruction."im While the Soviets are in desperate need of
Western assistance,' they stand poised to become full members of the
global economy. By economically participating with the rest of the
industrial world, particularly the United States, the Soviet Union can begin
to save its failing domestic economy. Bilateral trade with the United
States would signify the beginning of the future Soviet economy as the
Soviets make the transition from their counterproductive Communist
system to a significantly more efficient free market economy. "
The American conditions for bilateral trade with the Soviet Union are
indeed quite reasonable. Following current American law,"° the Soviet
Union must codify and enforce a liberal emigration procedure, consistent
with Western standards of citizens' rights. While the Soviets unnecessari-
ly delay the passage of such legislation,' ° both economies are losing
time, money and business opportunities. Moreover, the Soviet people
must continue to live in a chaotic, decaying economy. The Soviet
government has expressed fears of mass emigration, but the reality of such
a movement of people greatly is exaggerated. 5 In reality, the consis-
tent enforcement of such legislation might assuage the peoples' fears and
help establish confidence in the government. Furthermore, emigration
legislation is the singular requirement needed to waive the Jackson-Vanik
restrictions 6 and begin a mutually profitable relationship between the
two countries. Once such emigration legislation is passed, President Bush
will submit the Trade Agreement of 1990 to Congress.0 7 Once the
accord is ratified by the legislature, Americans and Soviets can begin to
100. Id.
101. Mosbacher Says, supra note 5, at 1429. Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher's
quote, "[t]hey need our help," sums up the general consensus of economic and financial
desparation he viewed in the Soviet Union. Id.
102. Farnsworth, Trade Break for Soviets May Be Speeded by U.S., N.Y. Times, Oct.
4, 1990, at D2, col. 5 (considering the possibilities of increased American exports to the
Soviet Union from both the fimancial and agricultural sectors of the economy).
103. Jackson-Vanik Amendment, supra note 24.
104. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 790; see Gerasimov on Agenda, supra note 7,
at Al (comparing Gerasimov's statements regarding the importance of emigration
legislation with other (specifically economic) legislative concerns currently before the
Supreme Soviet).
105. The Economist estimates a maximum possible emigration figure of two million
people out of the total Soviet population of approximately 280 million people (less than
10% of the total population). The Economist Survey on the Soviet Union, supra note 63.
106. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
107. Major Agreements, supra note 6, at 786.
[Vol. I11
ADVANCING SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE
establish long-term, mutually lucrative business relations. These new ties
would metamorphose the Soviet economic system so it can compete
globally while preventing its people from remaining forever trapped in a
disintegrating economy.
Balancing the Soviet interests of sovereignty over its internal affairs
with the critical need to transform the economy leads to only one
conclusion. Emigration legislation must be passed so that the United
States and the Soviet Union can begin to take advantage of the unlimited
business opportunities that bilateral trade offers these two superpowers.
In order for the Soviet government and its people to build a free market
economy, the Soviet people must be granted the right to choose their
homeland.
VI. CONCLUSION
Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has anything to lose by
developing this potentially lucrative business relationship. On the
contrary, by expanding markets and making investment opportunities and
financial credits available, both countries will only profit as each domestic
economy responds and expands in conjunction with the new business
establishments that inevitably would arise from the Trade Agreement of
1990. Both countries would experience growth in all sectors of the
economy, including agriculture, manufacturing industries and service
industries. Technologies would be exchanged and improved, furthering
the overall efficiency of each economic sector.
According to the Trade Agreement of 1990, emigration legislation
must be promulgated to both accord citizens their basic rights and to allow
mutually beneficial bilateral trade to develop."' By enacting such
legislation, the Soviet Union will allow unprecedented economic coopera-
tion to take place which directly will increase the economic strength of
both nations and at the same time, grant human rights and commercial
incentives to a populace that has been made indifferent by tight-fisted
government control over its failed economy.
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VII. APPENDIX
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Agreement on Trade
Relations. 29 I.L.M. 946 (1990). The I.L.M. Content Summary sets
forth the goals and applicable provisions of the Trade Agreement of 1990:
At the Malta meeting in December 1989, the United States proposed that
the June summit be the target date for completion of a trade agreement,
provided the U.S.S.R. approved and implemented new emigration
legislation. Since new emigration legislation had passed the first reading
in the Supreme Soviet and a second reading had been scheduled, the trade
agreement was concluded on June 1. At the signing, the U.S. indicated
the importance of passing the Soviet emigration law.
The trade agreement provides improved market access, facilitates
business, and offers strong intellectual property rights protection. A
number of understandings were concluded through the exchange of letters
and they form an integral part of the agreement.
[Preamble - To foster commercial ties between Soviet organizations and
U.S. nationals and companies]
Art. I MOST FAVORED NATION AND NONDISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT
[Exceptions include advantages accorded: By a Party in a customs
union or free trade area; to facilitate frontier traffic; in accor-
dance with GATT; to developing countries; under Article XI of
this Agreement (market disruption)]
Art. II GENERAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO MARKET
ACCESS FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
[National treatment; use of arms-length contractual relations;
barter and counter-trade are not to be encouraged; no less
favorable technical regulations and standards]
Art. III EXPANSION AND PROMOTION OF TRADE
[Duty of each party to encourage and facilitate trade relations]
Art. IV GOVERNMENT COMMERCIAL OFFICES
[Hiring practices; access; participation. See Annexes]
Art. V BUSINESS FACILITATION
[Duty of each party to facilitate the business of the other within
its territory]
Art. VI TRANSPARENCY
[Duty of each party to make its trade laws and data available to
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the other]
Art. VII FINANCIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO TRADE IN
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
[Currency; foreign exchange controls; foreign exchange accounts;
exchange rates]
Art. VIII PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
[Adherence to the Berne Convention]
Art. IX TRANSIT
[Each party shall facilitate the transit, through its own territory,
of the other party's goods]
Art. X SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC COOPERATION
[Service industries; statistics and standards]
Art. XI MARKET DISRUPTION SAFEGUARDS
[Rights of the importing party when emergency action is neces-
sary]
Art. XII DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
[Access to national courts; waiver of immunities; arbitration;
enforcement of arbitral awards]
Art. XIII NATIONAL SECURITY
[Retained right of each party to take action for the protection of
its security interests]
Art. XIV CONSULTATIONS
[Agreement to consult periodically through the Joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission]
Art. XV DEFINITIONS
[Company; commerical representation; national; organization]
Art. XVI GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
[Measures referred to comply with laws and regulations not
contrary to the purposes of this Agreement; measures to protect
intellectual property; measures referred to Art. XX of GATT]
Art. XVII ENTRY INTO FORCE, TERM AND TERMINATION
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